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SELECTIVE SERVICE APPELLATE PRACTICE--
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In conscientious objector cases, judicial review of Selective Service
decisions has traditionally been limited to a search of the record for a
basis in fact to sustain the registrant's classification.' If the record re-
veals facts casting doubt upon the registrant's sincerity and good faith
in claiming conscientious objector status, then a presumption arises
that the Selective Service acted lawfully in denying classification as a
conscientious objector.2 The classification decision is, therefore, af-
firmed by the court. United States v. Atherton,' a case recently de-
cided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, presents an impor-
tant new development in the law of judicial review.4 It enlarges the
1. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 382 (1955). The role of the courts
is to review the record for "objective facts ... [which] cast doubt on [the] sincerity of
[the] claim." Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957). The
scope of judicial review is "the narrowest known to the law." The basis in fact test is
also set out in 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (1967) as follows: "That such review shall
go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards, appeal boards, and
the President only when there is no basis in fact for the classification assigned to such
registrant." For a discussion of section 460(b)(3), see Shaw, Selective Service Litiga-
tion and the 1967 Statute, 48 Mi=TARY L. Rlv. 33, 62 (1970). For a review of the con-
stitutionality of section 460(b) (3) see Comment, Pre-Induction Judicial Review Held
Unavailable to Registrant Claiming Statutory Deferment, 44 N.Y.U.L. PEv. 804
(1969); Note, 83 HARv. L. REv. 261 (1969).
2. E.g., Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d 255, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1966); Cramer
v. France, 148 F.2d 801, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1945). See also Bowles v. United States,
319 U.S. 33, 36 (1943).
3. 430 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1970). The court issued its first opinion on October
9, 1969, rejecting Atherton's conviction. The Government filed a Petition for Rehear-
ing En Bank claiming that the majority's opinion conflicted with established case and
statutory law. On April 1, 1970, a second opinion was handed down by the court.
Subsequently the Government filed a second Petition for Rehearing En Banc, alleging
the existence of a basis in fact to doubt Atherton's sincerity. On Sept. 10, 1970, the
court withdrew the previous two opinions and substituted a third. Judge Browning
stated that no further "petition for rehearing or suggestion for en bank rehearing will
be entertained." 430 F.2d at 746. [The first and second opinions of the court will
hereinafter be cited as Atherton, Oct. opinion and Atherton, Apr. opinion.]
4. Judicial review of draft boards procedure is more restricted than judicial re-
view of administrative action generally. As the Supreme Court noted in Estep: "The
provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final' means to us that Congress
chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope of judicial
review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh
the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was
justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with regulations are
final even though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local
scope of judicial inquiry into Selective Service appeal board review
practices and will cause the Selective Service appeal boards to change
their previous procedure of affirming or rejecting local board classi-
fications by an unelaborated yes-no vote.' Under the Atherton rule, if
the local board applies incorrect legal standards to deny a conscientious
objector exemption, and if the appeal board affirms the local board's
decision, the appeal board is required to state explicitly the reasons for
its classification of the registrant. This Note will examine the rationale
behind the Atherton decision, its consistency with prior decisions and
its possible future effects.
In Atherton, the local board applied incorrect legal standards in
denying Atherton's claim for exemption from military service as a con-
scientious objector.6 The appeal board affirmed the local board's de-
cision without indicating its reasons for affirmance.7 There was some
uncertainty as to whether the record revealed a basis in fact for denial
of Atherton's conscientious objector claim. Judges Browning and
Hamley held the appeal board's review of Atherton's file insufficient to
cure local board error and reversed Atherton's conviction.8 In his dis-
sent, Judge Ely contended that the presumption of lawful operation of
the appeal board, plus the existence of a basis in fact on the record for
doubting Atherton's sincerity, obviated the need for a recitation of the
grounds for the appeal board's decision.9
board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave to
the registrant." Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1946). The Govern-
ment noted that: "As it now stands the majority opinion in Atherton jeopardizes
thousands of appeal board classification decisions which predate Atherton and which
were in harmony with the then established case law of this and other circuits. By
allowing the courts to judge the actions of an appeal board by considering the prior
actions of a local board, the majority opinion dramatically expands the boundaries of
judicial review in an area where the scope of review has been consistently held to be
'the narrowest known to law.' Maynard v. United States, 409 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir.
1969)." First Petition for Rehearing, United States v. Atherton, 430 F.2d 741 (9th
Cir. 1970).
5. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.21-.27 (1970). In particular, section 1626.27(a) pro-
vides: "When the appeal board makes its classification, it shall record its decision show-
ing a yes or no vote upon the Individual Appeal Record ...... There is no statute re-
quiring the appeal board to make any finding of fact or conclusion of law. See
Gatchell v. United States, 378 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1967); DeRemer v. United States, 340
F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965). For cases in the Ninth Circuit conflicting with Atherton
see Bishop v. United States, 412 F.2d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1969); Storey v. United
States, 370 F.2d 255, 259 (9th Cir. 1966); Tyrrell v. United States, 200 F.2d 8, 11 (9th
Cir. 1952).
6. Atherton, Apr. opinion, at 2-3.
7. Atherton, Oct. opinion, at 5.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 5.
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Local Board Classificaion'--Erroneous
Legal Standards Applied
Defendant Atherton's local board had rejected his conscientious
objector claim" on the grounds that "[he was] not a member of any
particular religious sect," and that he based his claim "on his own per-
sonal beliefs."' 2  It is settled law, however, that to qualify for a con-
scientious objector exemption one need not be a member of a religious
sect.' 3 As the Supreme Court pointed out in United States v. Seeger:
The Congress recognized that one might be religious without be-
longing to an organized church just as surely as minority members
of a faith not opposed to war might through religious reading reach
a conviction against participation in war. [W]hile shifting the
test from membership in such a church to one's individual belief the
Congress nevertheless continued its historic practice of excusing
from armed service those who believed that they owed an obliga-
tion superior to that due the state of not participating in war in any
form.14
Since Atherton expressly claimed "religious faith" as the basis of his
objection to war, and nothing in the record contradicted his statement,
the Ninth Circuit held that the local board erred by using "membership
in a religious sect" as its legal standard for interpreting religious train-
ing and belief.' 5
10. A review of the attitudes and work practices of 4,080 local boards is avail-
able in NATIONAL ADvIsoRY Comm'N ON SELECTIVE SERViCE, IN PuRsurr oF EQUITY:
WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? (1967). At the time of the Commission Report
the average local board consisted of three male members, white, over 30 years of age,
and veterans of military service. Id., Table 1.6 at 75, Table 1.2 at 73, Table 1.3 at 74.
Cited in Ginger, Minimum Due Process Standards in Selective Service Cases-Part 1,
19 HASTINGS LJ. 1313, 1323 (1968).
11. See generally HANDBOOK FOR CONSCImErIOUS OBJECTORS (9th ed. A. Tatum
1967) (Central Committee for Conscientious Objector Cases pub.); Smith, Conscien-
tious Objection to Military Service: A Layman's View, 26 GuImL PRACTITIONER 65
(1967); Note, Pre-Induction Availability of the Right to Claim Conscientious Objector
Exemption, 72 YALE L.J. 1459 (1963); Comment, Selective Service Litigation
Since 1960, 23 MILTARY L. REv. 101 (1964); An Examination of Fairness in Selective
Service Procedure, 37 GEo. WASH. L REv. 564 (1969).
12. Atherton, Apr. opinion, at 2.
13. The statutory authority for a conscientious objector claim is section 456(j)
of the Selective Service Act of 1967 which states: "Nothing contained in this title...
shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service
in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief,
is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this subsec-
tion, the term 'religious training and belief' does not include essentially political, socio-
logical, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." 50 U.S.C. App. §
456(j) (1970). For an analysis of the application of the act, see White, Processing
Conscientious Objector Claims: A Congressional Inquiry, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 652
(1968).
14. 380 U.S. 163, 172 (1965).
15. Atherton, Apr. opinion, at 2.
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Another related ground for the rejection of Atherton's claim by
the local board was that the defendant based his claim "on his own
personal beliefs."1  This, the court noted, could have been a reference
to the exclusion of conscientious objector claims based upon "a merely
personal moral code." 17  But this exclusion applies only where the
moral code is the sole basis for the defendant's opposition to war.' 8
It does not apply in cases like Atherton, where the registrant's moral
code is closely interwoven with his religious beliefs.
The Ninth Circuit majority found nothing in the local board's
minutes to indicate that the board had considered the sincerity of
Atherton's claim. 19 The board had discussed whether Atherton was a
"genuine conscientious objector," but subsequent entries in the lo-
cal board's minutes led the court to conclude that the board was "re-
ferring to whether [the] defendant's claim fell within the statutory
definition of a conscientious objector and not to the sincerity of his
claim. '
Judge Ely vigorously dissented, contending that the majority opin-
ion was unsupported by the facts."' He felt the majority violated tra-
ditional principles of judicial review when it analyzed the local board's
minutes to discover the rationale of the board's classification.22
[M]y Brothers attempt to bolster their decision by hypothecating
[sic] what might have been the basis of the board's action by taking
from their context certain statements which were made during
Atherton's personal appearance before the local board. In the proc-
ess, the majority appears to ignore the traditional and often recog-
nized presumption that the board has performed its duties with reg-
ularity. See, e.g., Bishop v. United States, 412 F.2d 1064, 1067
(9th Cir. 1969). I believe that this approach is improper under
the established principles which limit our role in these matters.23
16. Id.
17. Id. See note 13 supra.
18. Id. In Seeger, the Supreme Court stated: "We have construed the statutory
definition broadly and it follows that any exception to it must be interpreted narrowly.
The use by Congress of the words 'merely personal' seems to us to restrict the exception
to a moral code which is not only personal but which is the sole basis for the registrant's
belief and is in no way related to a Supreme Being." United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 186 (1965) (emphasis added).
19. 430 F.2d at 743.
20. Id.
21. 430 F.2d at 747.
22. Id.
23. Atherton, Apr. opinion, at 12. See, e.g., Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d
255 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Chodorski, 240 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1956);
Tomlinson v. United States, 216 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1954); Reed v. United States,
205 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1953); Davis v. United States, 203 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1953);
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 996 (1953); Tyrrell v. United States, 200 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1952);
Cramer v. France, 148 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1945). These are cases in which the courts
[Vol. 22THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Basis in Fact Issue
Judicial review of Selective Service classifications is traditionally
restricted to ascertaining (1) whether the local board's determination
had some basis in fact on the record and (2) whether the board ap-
plied a correct legal standard. 24 Judge Ely tacitly conceded that Ather-
ton had made out a prima facie conscientious objector claim, but main-
tained that ample facts supported an inference that his beliefs were not
sincerely held.25
For instance, the dissent notes, Atherton had been classified 1-A
when he left the University of California at Santa Barbara after com-
pleting one-half of his freshman year. To avoid the possibility of fu-
ture induction, he then preregistered at U.C.S.B. 6 months before the
fall semester began and meanwhile attended a summer session at Chaf-
fey College. When ordered to report for induction, he requested and
eventually received a I1-S deferment to complete the school year. When
this deferment expired Atherton was again classified I-A and received
his second order to report for induction. At this time, Atherton re-
quested a reopening of his classification and completed a Conscientious
Objector's Form (SSS Form No. 150). The local board cancelled
Atherton's second induction order to consider his new claim for exemp-
tion."' The board then refused to grant Atherton a conscientious ob-
jector exemption but did grant him a personal appearance to contest
this decision.27 At his appearance before the board, Atherton informed
its members of his beliefs concerning war which, he claimed had crys-
tallized within the preceding 2 years. The board could not reconcile
this claim with his failure to request conscientious objector status prior
to his first induction order, since Atherton had claimed he held these
applied the presumption of validity of an appeal board decision where the registrant's lo-
cal board allegedly applied erroneous standards.
24. See United States v. Carroll, 398 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1968); Peterson v.
Clark, 289 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1968). See generally Note, Fairness and Due
Process Under the Selective Service System, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1014 (1966).
25. 430 F.2d at 747.
26. No uniform standards of proof govern the local board's decision to open the
registrant's file. The board is directed to "consider new information which it receives
and, if the local board determines that such new information justifies a change in the
registrant's classification, the local board shall reopen and classify the registrant anew.
If the local board determines that such new information does not justify a change in the
registrant's classification, it shall not reopen the registrant's classification." 32 C.F.R.
§ 1624.2(c) (1970).
27. The registrant can request a personal appearance before his local board or he
can appeal to the appeal board. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1624.1, 1626.2(a) (1970). There is
no right'to counsel at the personal appearance. id. § 1624.1(b). The appearance of
witnesses is at the board's discretion. Id. § 1624.1(b). See generally Comment, The
Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54 CALIm. L. REv.
2123, 2154-56 (1966).
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beliefs for the preceding 2 years." His claim, therefore, was again de-
nied by the local board. The appeal board unanimously affirmed. -9
At the induction center, Atherton indicated that he was addicted
to drugs, tended toward homosexuality and was suffering or had suf-
fered from, inter alia, mumps; eye trouble; running ears; hay fever;
soaking sweats; asthma; palpitations of the heart; frequent and pain-
ful urination; sugar and albumin in the urine; recent loss of weight;
car, train, sea, and air sickness; frequent trouble sleeping; frequent and
terrifying nightmares; depression and excessive worry; loss of memory
or amnesia and staphylococcus. No evidence of these afflictions was
discovered by the examining physicians.3 0 Under these circumstances,
Judge Ely asserted that "indubitably, there was [a] 'basis in fact' for
the challenged classification."31
Judge Ely did not pinpoint which facts in the record gave rise to
inferences of Atherton's insincerity. Atherton's untruthful represen-
tations concerning his medical history were made at the induction cen-
ter after the administrative review process was over; these misrepre-
sentations therefore could not suffice as a basis in fact. The only "in-
consistency" in Atherton's statements was his failure to notify the local
board of his conscientious objection to war, prior to his first induction
order. This omission, coupled with Atherton's dropping out of school
and subsequent early preregistration to qualify for a II-S deferment, was
apparently interpreted by Judge Ely as a basis in fact to doubt Ather-
ton's sincerity.
28. Atherton, Apr. opinion, at 12. For discussion concerning when one may
claim to have crystallized his beliefs as a conscientious objector see United States v.
Gearey, 379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967); Clancy &
Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems in Conceptual Clarity and
Constitutional Considerations, 17 MAINE L. REv. 143, 147 (1965); Note, Selective
Service: Conscientious Objection, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1038 (1970); Note, Pre-Induction
Availability of the Right to Claim Conscientious Objector Exemption, 72 YALE L.J.
1459 (1963).
29. Atherton, Apr. opinion, at 12-14. If the decision of the appeal board is not
unanimous, the registrant can appeal to the President. 32 C.F.R. § 1627.3 (1970).
30. Atherton, Apr. opinion, at 14.
31. 430 F.2d at 747. In the first two opinions the majority rejected the argument
that the local board had any basis in fact for finding Atherton's claim insincere. The
defendant's failure to mention his conscientious opposition to war on prior deferment
applications, the court held, did not give rise to an inference of insincerity or bad faith.
The majority relied on Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955), where the
Supreme Court held that successive deferment applications, inconsistent with a con-
scientious objector claim, are sufficient to cast doubt on the registrant's sincerity. In
Witmer the registrant had first contended he was a farmer on his family's land. In his
farm exemption claim, Witmer expressly disclaimed any ministerial exemption by writ-
ing the phrase, "Does not apply," opposite the line inquiring whether he was a "Minis-
ter, or Student Preparing for the Ministry." Id. at 378. In addition, he promised to
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Appeal Board Review8 2
The Selective Service appeal board, in theory, reviews and exam-
ines a registrant's local board classification de novo in order to discover
and cure error or prejudice by the local board. 33  The federal regula-
tions prohibit relevant additional information, not made available to the
local board, from being presented to the appeal board.3 4 Since the
registrant makes a personal appearance only before the local board,
such factors as his demeanor, his manner of answering questions and
his personal appearance give the local board special insights not
available to those reviewing the record. This fact alone seems to ne-
cessitate a more limited appeal board review, since the sincerity of the
registrant can be more accurately evaluated by the local board. The
Ninth Circuit in Atherton did not expressly state whether any basis in
fact existed, but Judge Ely, in his dissent, argued that the majority had
tacitly so conceded.35
Traditionally, denial of a conscientious objector classification will
be upheld when the court's review of the record reveals a basis in fact
for doubting the applicant's sincerity.3 The Ninth Circuit's decision in
increase farm production and to "contribute a satisfactory amount for the war effort"
Id. at 378. Later, it was discovered, the land had been uncultivated for 23 years. Id.
Eight days after his exemption claim as a farmer was denied, Witmer applied for an
exemption as a full-time minister. Id. at 379. The Supreme Court held these
deferment applications inconsistent and affirmed the conviction.
In Atherton, on the other hand, the registrant was granted a student deferment and
after it had expired, sought conscientious objector status. The Ninth Circuit found no
inference of insincerity from these successive claims, because Atherton's request for de-
ferment as a student was not inconsistent with his views in opposition to war. Ather-
ton, Apr. opinion, at 3.
32. The appeal board is normally composed of five members who are citizens,
not members of the armed forces, between 30 and 75 years old and residents of the area
of the registrant. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.22 (1970).
33. See Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d 255, 260 (9th Cir. 1966); DeRemer v.
United States, 340 F.2d 712, 719 (8th Cir. 1965).
34. The material presented to the appeal board is limited by 32 C.F.R. § 1626.24
(1970) which states, in part: "(b) In reviewing the appeal and classify the registrant,
the appeal board shall not review or consider any information other than the following:
(1) Information contained in the record received from the local board.
(2) General information concerning economic, industrial, and social conditions."
35. "If I interpret this third opinion correctly, the majority has now, in essence,
reverted to that position [the existence of a basis in fact to doubt Atherton's sin-
cerity] which was so vigorously assailed by the Government in its first Petition for
Rehearing." 430 F.2d at 747.
36. See, e.g., Oesterich v. Selective Serv. 393 U.S. 233, 239 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1966); DeRemer v.
United States, 340 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965); Tomlinson v. United States, 216 F.2d 12
(9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 970 (1955); cf. Shepherd v. United States, 217
F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1954); Wells v. United States, 158 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 827 (1947); United States v. Fratrick, 140 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1944).
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Atherton did not turn on the basis in fact test. Instead, the court went
beyond the normal scope of judicial review to consider the effect upon
the Selective Service process of the local board's use of illegal classifi-
cation standards. The result was a policy statement concerning the so-
called cure doctrine.
Cure Doctrine
Federal courts are called upon to review Selective Service classifi-
cation decisions whenever a registrant challenges the validity of his
classification as a defense to a criminal prosecution for refusal to sub-
mit to induction. It is not unusual for the reviewing court to discover
both (1) that the defendant's local board relied on incorrect legal stand-
ards when it refused to classify him as a conscientious objector; 37 and
(2) that the record reveals a basis in fact for doubting the defendant's
sincerity. If in such a case the local board's decision has been reviewed
and affirmed by the appeal board, and if the appeal board gives no
reason for affirmance, the reviewing court has traditionally presumed
that the appeal board disregarded the local board's legal errors and re-
lied solely on facts in the record showing insincerity. This presump-
tion is known as the "cure doctrine. '38
The cure doctrine, as developed by the courts, is subject to certain
limitations and exceptions. It does not apply if the local board refuses
to include certain evidence in the registrant's file, for in that case the
appeal board could not detect and correct the error.39 Similarly, the
doctrine does not apply if the local board's errors result in an inade-
quate presentation of the registrant's claim before the appeal board.4"
Although the Atherton majority held the cure doctrine inapplicable,
it did state that the doctrine will continue to apply in cases where the
record affirmatively indicates nonadoption of the local board's error by
the appeal board.41
37. E.g., United States v. Stepler, 258 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1958) (local board
used illegal standard); United States v. Peebles, 220 F.2d 114, 119-20 (7th Cir. 1955)
(appeal board influenced by the local board's bias); United States v. Fry, 203 F.2d
638, 640 (2d Cir. 1953) (inadequate presentation before appeal board).
38. E.g., Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d 255, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1966); Cramer
v. France, 148 F.2d 801, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1945). See also Bowles v. United States, 319
U.S. 33, 35-36 (1943).
39. See United States v. Fry, 203 F.2d 638, 640 (2d Cir. 1953); United States
v. Zieber, 161 F.2d 90, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1947).
40. United States v. Peebles, 220 F.2d 114, 119-20 (7th Cir. 1955); United States
v. Stiles, 169 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Zeiber, 161 F.2d 47 (3d Cir.
1947).
41. For cases where errors were corrected before the appeal board acted, see
Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d 255, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Moore,
217 F.2d 428, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1954); Tyrrell v. United States, 200 F.2d 8, 11 (9th
Cir. 1952).
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The error of law committed by Atherton's local board was its mis-
interpretation of the statutory criteria for determining the validity of a
conscientious objector claim.42 Upon review, the appeal board made
no comment on the local board's error, but merely affirmed the local
board's action. The majority held the cure doctrine inapplicable be-
cause it could not be "assumed that the appeal board applied proper
classification standards in this case."4 3
As Judge Ely pointed out, the majority's holding departed from
earlier cases in the Ninth and other circuits insofar as it rejected the
presumption of appeal board correction of local board error." The
majority's decision in Atherton appears to establish a presumption of
appeal board adoption of local board error unless the appeal board ex-
pressly recites a lawful basis for its decision.
In order to support its holding that the cure doctrine should not
apply in Atherton, the Ninth Circuit surveyed a considerable volume of
prior decisional authority. A Second Circuit case, United States v.
Stepler,45 was cited as authority for holding the cure doctrine inappli-
cable. In Stepler, the facts were similar to the facts of Atherton. Step-
ler's local board had relied upon an erroneous legal standard in deny-
ing his request for a ministerial exemption as a Jehovah's Witness. The
Stepler court noted:
[T]he question in a case of this kind is whether the original irregu-
larities before the local board affected the review by the appeal
board, in other words, whether the decision of the appeal board
perpetuated the procedural errors of the local board ...
From this record we cannot tell whether the appeal board ac-
cepted the [unlawful] reasons given by the local board. Since the
record is so unclear, we cannot say that the error of the local board
was cured on appeal.46
The Ninth Circuit drew additional support for the Atherton de-
cision from dictum by Judge Friendly in United States v. Corliss:
47
It is settled that where there is no evidence that the Apeal Board
has been misled, unfair conduct by members of the Local Board will
not upset a classification. . . . Cases where the Local Board had
applied an erroneous test and it is impossible to tell whether the
Appeal Board relied on this. . . are distinguishable.
Both of these Second Circuit cases tend to support the proposition
that the cure doctrine should not apply in a case where, as in Atherton,
42. Atherton, Apr. opinion, at 2-3.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Atherton, Oct. opinion, at 6. See cases cited note 24 supra.
45. 258 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1958).
46. Id. at 316-17.
47. 280 F.2d 808, 816-17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960)
(emphasis added).
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the local board relies on erroneous legal standards and the appeal board
affirms the local board's classification decision without comment,
thereby making it impossible for the reviewing court to determine
whether or not the appeal board endorsed the local board's error. But
even though Atherton may bring the Ninth Circuit into line with other
circuits in this respect, it throws the Ninth Circuit itself into a state of
conflict.4s In Bishop v. United States,49 for example, the defendant at-
tempted to show that his local board relied on erroneous legal stand-
ards in rejecting his conscientious objector claim.5° In Bishop, as in
Atherton, the appeal board gave no reason for rejecting Bishop's
claim.5' The court nevertheless found a "basis in fact" for doubting the
defendant's sincerity.5 2 The basis in fact, coupled with the presumption
of the lawful operation of the appeal board, led the court to sustain the
denial of the defendant's claim. Judge Ely, writing for the majority in
Bishop, asserted:
Initially, we must reject Bishop's assumption that were we to de-
cide that incorrect standards were applied by his local board, re-
versal is required. That question was settled in Tomlinson v.
United States, 216 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
970 (1955), 75 S. Ct. 528, 99 L. Ed. 755, wherein we explained
that it is the very purpose of the appeal board to correct any local
board errors by making its separate investigation of the registrant's
file and an independent classification decision. [Citations omit-
ted.] Accordingly, we limit our scrutiny to the standards applied
by Bishop's appeal board.53
In Atherton, the majority discounted any apparent conflict with
Bishop. They interpreted Bishop merely as a rejection of the conten-
tion that reversal is required if the local board used incorrect standards.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Bishop is di-
48. Cases cited note 5 supra.
49. 412 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1969).
50. Id. at 1065. Prior to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, the appeal
board could seek an advisory opinion concerning the registrant's conscientious objector
claim from the Department of Justice. Bishop contended that the Department's un-
favorable recommendation rested upon illegal grounds and hence invalidated the appeal
board's rejection of his claim. See also Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955);
Shepherd v. United States, 217 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1954). Since the local board is the
only agency in the induction process before which the registrant may personally appear,
some courts have held that anything less than a full and fair hearing will invalidate
the petitioner's classification, even if he is reclassified by his appeal board. E.g.,
Franks v. United States, 216 F.2d 266, 270 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v. Craig, 207
F.2d 888, 891 (3d Cir. 1953); Mintz v. Howlett, 207 F.2d 758, 762 (2d Cir. 1953);
Knox v. United States, 200 F.2d 398, 401-02 (9th Cir. 1952). See also Niznik v.
United States, 173 F.2d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 1949).
51. 412 F.2d at 1065.
52. Id. at 1069.
53. Id. at 1065-66.
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rectly contrary to the majority holding in Atherton. Atherton sets up
procedural rules which, if not followed, require reversal. If the local
board errs and the appeal board gives no indication that it relied upon
independent classification standards, then even if there existed a basis
in fact in the record to support it, the classification decision will be re-
versed.54 This was precisely the contention advanced by Bishop, which
the court in that case rejected.
Case Authority for the Ninth Circuit's Position
Perhaps in an effort to minimize its clear departure from prior
case law, the Atherton majority relied on various points-not all of them
relevant-in other draft cases to buttress its holding.
For instance, the first two cases, Bowles v. United States55 and
United States v. Morico,56 are not squarely in point, since neither pre-
sented a situation in which the defendant's local board committed ma-
terial errors of law. In Bowles, the defendant alleged that his local
board applied an incorrect legal standard in determining his conscien-
tious objector claim. 57  Bowles took an appeal to the President before
the local draft board issued its order.58 In such cases, decision for the
President is made by the Director of Selective Service. 9 The order for
induction was based upon the intervening Selective Service Director's
decision, which had the effect of superseding the local board's action.60
Therefore Bowles, unlike Atherton, did not reach the question of the
legality of the local board's classification standard.6
In Morico, the local and appeal board chairmen testified at the
defendant's trial that they both had applied different criteria in classi-
fying him.62  The court explicitly noted: "A reading of that transcript
makes it absolutely clear that the proper legal standard was applied by
the local board."63  Bowles and Morico clearly differ from Atherton
since, in those cases, no actual local board error was established.
54. Atherton, Apr. opinion, at 8. In the official opinion the court did not say
whether there was a basis in fact on the record to doubt Atherton's sincerity.
55. 319 U.S. 33 (1943).
56. 415 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1969).
57. 319 U.S. at 34.
58. Id. at 35.
59. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 628.1, 54 Stat. 885 (now 32
C.F.R. § 1627.1(b) 1970).
60. 319 U.S. at 35-36. The regulations provide that "[wihenever an appeal to
the President has been taken by a person entitled to do so, any order to report for induc-
tion which has previously been issued to the registrant shall be ineffective and shall be
cancelled by the local board." 32 C.F.R. § 1527.8 (1970).
61. 319 U.S. at 34-35.
62. United States v. Morico, 415 F.2d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1969).
63. Id. at 143.
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In the third and fourth cases relied upon by the majority, any
possible error by the local board was moot, because the appeal board
expressly adopted independent classification criteria for the petitioner.
DeRemer v. United States64 held simply that the registrant need not be
furnished with a copy of the Department of Justice hearing officer's
report and the report may be omitted from his selective service file for
review by his appeal board. Defendant DeRemer contended that the
hearing officer's report was based on erroneous conclusions of law and
that his local board was biased and denied him a fair hearing.65 The
defendant desired conscientious objector status but was employed in a
factory doing solely defense work for the Navy. The court noted that
DeRemer could not attack his I-A-O (exemption from combatant serv-
ice) classification by his appeal board merely because of alleged local
board bias. The I-A-O classification was made by the appeal board
and not by the local board,6 6 which had classified him I-A.67
In United States v. Van Hook,68 the appeal board sent a letter
to the local board stating that its classification decision was reached in-
dependently of the local board's. 9 The issue of an alleged improper
standard applied at the local board level was, therefore, never reached;
it was held immaterial in view of the appeal board's review and classifi-
cation de novo.7°
The operation of a cure doctrine presupposes some error by the
local board. Independent classification by the appeal board should be
the normal mode of its operation. However, unless an error by the
local board is established, there is no reason to apply the cure doctrine.
The above cases are not controlling authority for the A therton ma-
jority's position that the cure doctrine applies only where the record in-
dicates that the local board error was not adopted by the appeal board.
In DeRemer and Van Hook, either the local board action was explicitly
found lawful, or its legality was not considered since the appeal board
expressly employed independent classification criteria.
Of all the cases the majority cited, Tomlinson v. United States7'
64. 340 F.2d 712, 715-16 (8th Cir. 1965).
65. Id. at 718-19.
66. Id. at 719.
67. Id. at 718. The court states: "In the instant case we have no denial of an
exemption in toto, but rather a limited exemption (from combatant service only) which
the Appeal Board apparently felt was all that was here justified. The Appeal Board can
only be considered as having made that decision from a consideration of all of the facts
before it, and this clearly includes the means by which appellant was then earning his
living." Id.
68. 284 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1960).
69. Id. at 491.
70. Id.
71. 216 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1954).
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is its strongest authority, because the facts in that case were similar to
those in Atherton.72 But even Tomlinson differed significantly from
Atherton, for the record affirmatively showed that the appeal board did
not adopt the error made by the local board. In Tomlinson, the regis-
trant was classified I-A-O by his appeal board. 73 He refused to perform
noncombatant military service and claimed that he should have been
classified I-0-that is, conscientiously opposed to both combatant and
noncombatant military service. The registrant claimed that his local
board denied him a full and fair hearing, because he was not permitted
to read the Bible to the board to substantiate his conscientious objector
claim.74  Also, the local board's minutes noted that the petitioner was
not "ordained" as a minister in a theological school. Tomlinson claimed
his board was setting up its own definition of a minister of religion.75
The court found that "such error was cured by the action of the appeal
board."7
Atherton is readily distinguishable from Tomlinson, since Ather-
ton's appeal board, unlike Tomlinson's, did not state the reason for its
affirmance of the local board action. Also, in Atherton, unlike Tom-
linson, it was established that the local board committed an error of law
in its classification decision.
Sicurella v. United States77 and Ypparila v. United States,78 also
cited by the Atherton majority, are similar to Atherton because in these
cases the appeal board apparently did not state the reason for its deci-
sion. The difficulty in using these cases to support Atherton, however,
is that in each case the erroneous standards applied by the local board
in classifying the registrant were based upon recommendations from
72. United States v. Atherton, 430 F.2d 741, 745 n.6 (9th Cir. 1970). The
Ninth Circuit in the same note also cites United States v. Chodorski, 240 F.2d 590
(7th Cir. 1956). Chodorski's local board applied an improper test in determining
whether he was a minister. Id. at 591. The petitioner filed a statement with his appeal
application pointing out the local board's mistake. Subsequently, the appeal board set
aside the petitioner's I-A classification and placed him in class I-0, that is, a con-
scentious objector. The appellant refused to perform any type of civilian work. He
was indicted and convicted for not accepting his assignment at the Illinois State Hos-
pital at Manteno. Id. This case is not in point since the appellant received a 1-0
classification from the appeal board. The majority's reliance on it may be explained by
their error in thinking Chodorski had received a I-A-O rather than a I-0 classification.
73. 216 F.2d at 13. "Conscientious objector[s] available for noncombatant mili-
tary service only" are classified I-A-O. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.11 (1970). "Conscientious
objector[s] available for civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national
health, safety, or interest" are classified 1-0. Id. § 1622.14.
74. 216 F.2d at 15.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 16.
77. 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
78. 219 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1954).
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the Department of Justice. Sicurella's willingness to fight in "theo-
cratic wars"79 was thought by the department to show a lack of sin-
cerity. In Ypparila, the defendant's classification may also have been
based upon statements that he believed in participation in theocratic
wars.
8 0
Such recommendations would naturally have greater influence on
the appeal board than would errors originating in the local board. The
majority, by relying upon Sicurella and Ypparila, proceeded upon the
rather implausible premise that an appeal board would be no more in-
fluenced by statements from the Department of Justice than by state-
ments from a local draft board. 8'
In his dissent, Judge Ely considered the majority's reliance on
Sicurella and Ypparila misplaced, and noted that the appeal board
"would be greatly influenced by an interpretation of existing law which
was supplied to it by the Department of Justice. 82  The Supreme
Court in Sicurella agreed:
[W]e feel that this error of law by the Department, to which the
Appeal Board might naturally look for guidance on such questions,
must vitiate the entire proceedings at least where it is not clear
that the Board relied on some legitimate ground. 83
Justice and the Selective Service Bureaucracy
Assuming there was a basis in fact to support a Selective Service
finding of insincerity, it is difficult to dispute Judge Ely's conclusion
that the Atherton majority made a departure from prior case law in
the Ninth Circuit. The indications are that this departure was a de-
sirable one. The cure doctrine-heavily relied upon in the dissenting
opinion-is of doubtful validity and wisdom in light of the realities of
the Selective Service System. Results of a recent survey underscore
79. The Supreme Court in Sicurella stated: "As to theocratic war, petitioner's
willingness to fight on the orders of Jehovah is tempered by the fact that, as far as we
know, their history. . . and their theology does not appear to contemplate one in the
future. And although Jehovah's Witnesses may fight in the Armageddon, we are not
able to stretch our imagination to the point of believing that the yardstick of the Con-
gress includes within its measure such spiritual wars between the powers of good and
evil where the Jehovah's Witnesses, if they participate, will do so without carnal
weapons." 348 U.S. at 390-91.
80. 219 F.2d at 468-69.
81. "Appeal board chairmen interviewed admitted their panels gave consideration
and credence to classifications made by local boards, particularly in close cases. Com-
ment, The Selective Service System: An Admniistrative Obstacle Course, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 2123, 2159 (1966), cited in United States v. Atherton, 430 F.2d 741, 746 n.9
(9th Cir. 1970).
82. Atherton, Oct. opinion, at 7.
83. 348 U.S. at 392.
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the dangers of presuming that appeal board review will cure local
board error in any given case:
In several jurisdictions where appeal board practices were studied
in connection with criminal charges against registrants for draft
refusal, it developed that the boards, staffed by volunteers, met
once or twice a month to consider a tremendous volume of files.
They decided a case every 10 seconds in a 4-or-5-hour session.s4
If this information is accurate, then it is fair to characterize the appeal
board decision as a mere echo or rubber-stamping of the local board's
classification decision. Thus the fundamental premise underlying the
Atherton decision-that the appeal board's decision is very likely to be
influenced by a local board's legal errors-seems eminently sound.
Conclusion
The effect of Atherton on future prosecutions for refusal to be in-
ducted may be summarized as follows: Under the Atherton rule, a
reviewing court must reverse the Selective Service classification deci-
sion in any case where (1) the local board's basis for its rejection of
the defendant's conscientious objector application includes erroneous le-
gal standards, and (2) the appeal board has affirmed the local board's
decision without expressly indicating on the record that its affirmance
rested on legal grounds and not on the local board's errors. This rule
apparently applies even where the defendant's Selective Service file re-
veals a basis in fact which would support a determination of insincer-
ityS8l-although a caveat should be introduced at this point, since the
Atherton majority did not expressly state whether they found a basis
in fact in the record then before the court. If a case should arise in
which the local board relies on erroneous legal standards, the appeal
board affirms without comment and the defendant's Selective Service
file clearly reveals a basis in fact sufficient to support a determination
of insincerity, the court might well uphold the classification decision
and distinguish Atherton on the ground that there no basis in fact was
clearly shown.
Stephen H. Pettigrew*
84. Margolis, Trying a Case Under the Selective Service Law, 26 GUJILD PRAc-
TIONER 100, 103 (1967). Another study in the San Francisco area indicated that local
boards averaged less than 1 minute's consideration per case during 1967. Hunn,
Draft Boards-A Guardian Probe, [San Francisco] Bay Guardian, Dec. 19, 1967, at 3,
col. 3. See also Ginger, Minimum Due Process Standards in Selective Service Cases-
Part 1, 19 HASTnNGs L.J. 1313 (1968).
85. United States v. Callison, No. 23,014 (9th Cir., Nov. 9, 1970).
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